National Culture and Corporate R&D Investment by Lee, Sanghoon
Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
ISSN 2201-4624 
Volume 12, Number 2, 2015, 309-332 
©  Copyright 2015 the authors.                                                            309 
 
National Culture and Corporate R&D Investment 
  
Sanghoon Lee 
Department of Economics, Hannam University,  
70 Hannamro, Daedeokgu, Daejeon 306-791, Republic of Korea 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between national culture and corporate R&D investment 
behavior. Based on Hofstede's work and the cushion hypothesis, we predict that firms in East Asian 
countries are more likely to engage in R&D investment than are firms in Western countries because East 
Asian cultures are collectivistic and long-term oriented while Western cultures are individualistic and 
short-term oriented. We use firm-level panel data for seven countries and apply dynamic GMM methods. 
The regression analysis shows that R&D investment is positively sensitive to internal funds for firms in 
East Asian countries, but not sensitive for firms in the Western countries. The result is robust to model 
specification and sample splitting. Moreover, the level of financial development and the legal 
environment do not systemically affect the relationship between R&D investment and internal funds. We 
suggest that this evidence supports the hypothesis that national culture affects corporate decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
Does national culture matter for economic behavior and performance? Kahn (1979) 
argued that the East Asian countries and regions such as Singapore, Taiwan, South 
Korea (Korea, hereafter), Hong Kong, and Japan had common culture roots of 
Confucian tradition, and this cultural inheritance provided a competitive advantage for 
economic growth. The seminal paper by Hofstede and Bond (1988) examined the 
relationship between Confucian teachings and economic development in Asia by using 
the IBM employee attitude surveys and found evidence supporting Kahn’s hypothesis. 
Thus, we can infer that national culture is a significant explanatory factor for cross-
country differences in economic behavior and performance. 
Given that national culture matters for economic activity, another question arises: Does 
national culture matter for firm behavior? Indeed, several studies have explored the 
effect of the dimensions of national culture proposed by Hofstede and Bond (1988) on 
business practices and performance. In addition to Confucianism, which is called later 
as the long-term orientation, Hofstede and Bond (1988) proposed four more dimensions 
of cross-cultural variation such as power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance, and they provided scores on the five dimensions for 50 countries. 
Straub et al. (1997) compared knowledge worker perceptions and use of the same 
technology in three countries--Japan, Switzerland, and the United States--and found 
that Hofstede’s indices were useful for explaining cross-cultural differences. Steensma 
et al. (2000) focused on the effect of national culture on the propensity of small, 
independent manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) to cooperate with other firms for 
technological innovation. They showed that SMEs in uncertainty avoiding or low 
masculinity or low individualistic countries were more likely to engage in technology 
alliances. Png et al. (2001) examined the adoption of a type of IT infrastructure (frame 
relay) and demonstrated that businesses from higher uncertainty avoidance countries 
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were less likely to adopt frame relay. These studies have confirmed the effect of national 
culture on firm behavior and strategy. 
In this context, this study addresses a more specific question: Does national culture 
affect corporate R&D investment decisions? The question of the effect of national 
culture on corporate R&D investment has not been studied extensively in previous 
research. It has been accepted that technological innovation based on R&D investment 
is important to economic development (see Guellec and Potterie, 2001 for an extensive 
empirical study). Thus, it is worthwhile determining whether cultural differences affect 
R&D decisions.  
In order to test the effect of cultural factors on corporate R&D decisions, the current 
study investigates firm-level panel data from seven OECD countries: Japan, Korea, 
Canada, France, Italy, UK, and US. These countries can be divided into two groups: East 
Asian countries (Japan and Korea) and Western countries (Canada, France, Italy, UK, 
and US). According to the scores on cultural dimensions Hofstede (2001), whereas the 
East Asian countries represent collectivistic culture, the Western countries represent 
individualistic culture. Moreover, the former countries have a long-term orientation, 
and the latter countries have a short-term orientation. The scores on cultural dimensions 
of the selected countries are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Scores on Cultural Dimensions 
 Individualism Long-term Orientation 
Group Country Rank Index Value Rank Index Value 
I 
Japan 
Korea 
22-23 
43 
46 
18 
4 
5 
80 
75 
II 
Canada 
France 
Italy 
UK 
US 
4-5 
10-11 
7 
3 
1 
80 
71 
76 
89 
91 
20 
NA 
NA 
18 
17 
23 
NA 
NA 
25 
29 
Notes: The table shows the scores on cultural dimensions for the selected countries reported by 
Hofstede (2001, p.215 & p.356). 
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The present study uses regression analysis to estimate the effect of internal funds such 
as cash flow on corporate R&D investment in the two groups of countries, and 
compares the two groups to determine whether the two groups differ significantly in 
terms of the sensitivity of investment to internal funds. The basic idea behind this 
analysis is that, if national culture can influence corporate R&D decision making, then 
the empirical results of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow will be significantly 
different across the two groups of countries. 
 
2 Hypothesis Development 
R&D investment has several characteristics that differentiate it from other investments. 
This study focuses on two key features: first, R&D outcomes are uncertain and thus 
R&D projects are usually risky; second, since it takes time for R&D inputs to generate 
outputs, R&D investment requires patience and a long-term view. Given these two 
features, risk-averseness and time horizon are highly relevant to R&D decision making. 
We discuss these two factors in turn, and develop a hypothesis for subsequent testing. 
First, we relate risk aversion to individualism, the first category by which to classify the 
countries. R&D is risky in that R&D outcomes are inherently uncertain. Thus, it is 
expected that risk-averse managers would underinvest in R&D. This naturally leads to 
the prediction that managers in risk-averse cultures are more hesitant to invest in R&D. 
Then, how are risk-averseness and individualism related? Is risk-taking encouraged in 
individualistic cultures? or in collectivistic cultures? 
An interesting finding relevant to the question of the relation between individualism 
and risk-taking was reported by Hsee and Weber (1999) which investigated cross-
national differences in risk preferences between Americans and Chinese (see Weber and 
Hsee, 2000 for a literature review). The study used questionnaire data to assign a risk 
preference index to each respondent. Participants in their study were from the 
University of Chicago and from Shanghai Chengjian University in China. The study 
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found, surprisingly, that the Chinese respondents were more risk-seeking than the 
American respondents, although participants predicted that the Americans would be 
more risk-seeking than the Chinese. Hsee and Weber (1999) explained their results in 
terms of a ‘cushion hypothesis’, which suggests that, because people in collectivist 
cultures are likely to receive financial help if they are in need, they are less risk averse 
than those in individualistic cultures. Many Chinese people live in extended families 
with a large number of relatives, and they can rely on this social network for support. 
Therefore, financial risk is not a big issue for them. This hypothesis is called the cushion 
hypothesis because the social network serves as a cushion that would hold individuals 
in case they fell. Other studies by the authors (Weber and Hsee, 1998; Weber and Hsee, 
1999) supported the cushion hypothesis. 
Also relevant in this respect is the work of Mandel (2003), which investigated the 
moderating role of risk domain in the effects of priming the interdependent self versus 
the independent self on risk-taking. The study distinguished between two types of 
individual risk: financial risk and social risk. Social risk refers to embarrassment or 
esteem among one's family or peers. It is reasonable to expect that individuals with the 
interdependent self will care more than individuals with the independent self to avoid 
social risks. It is known that Asian cultures foster an interdependent perspective on the 
self, while American culture emphasizes an independent perspective on the self 
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Combining this expectation with the cushion hypothesis, 
Mandel (2003) predicted that interdependent individuals would be less likely to take 
social risks but more likely to take financial risks than would independent individuals. 
The study found experimental evidence that interdependent individuals were more 
risk-seeking in their financial choices and less risk-seeking in their social choices than 
were independent individuals. 
From this, it appears to be clear that individuals from collectivist cultures are more 
likely to take financial risks than are individuals from individualistic cultures. If this is 
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the case, then a question may arise: What about organizations such as firms? Are 
organizations in collectivistic cultures more likely to take risks? More specifically, are 
firms in collectivist cultures more likely to be risk seeking? We argue that the answer to 
the question is yes. Decisions in an organization are made by individuals or groups in 
the organization, and when making decisions, the individuals or the groups are 
influenced by the cultural context in which the organization operates. Thus, if 
individuals from collectivist cultures are risk takers, then so are organizations in 
collectivistic cultures. Obviously, risk takers are more likely to engage in risky activities 
such as R&D. Thus, firms in collectivistic cultures are more likely to be active in R&D 
than firms in individualistic cultures.  
Business groups such as Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol may be thought of 
examples of the cushion hypothesis at the organizational level. It is widely suggested 
that business groups facilitate mutual insurance and risk sharing among affiliated firms. 
In Japan, the group’s main bank often assists distressed firms within the group with the 
help of other group members, which acts as a kind of risk sharing within keiretsu firms 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, p.302). In Korea, firms in a chaebol are usually controlled by 
the founding family, which exercises control through interlocking ownership among 
the firms. The firms can obtain much of their financing within their own group. Chaebols 
redistribute funds within the group and thus reduce the affiliated firms' risk of financial 
distress (Shin and Park, 1999, pp.172-173). Using the internal capital markets, managers 
in chaebol firms can be more risk seeking. 
Second, since it takes time for R&D to have an effect on earnings, R&D requires a long-
term perspective. This leads to the prediction that firms in long-term orientation 
cultures are more likely to be active in R&D than firms in short-term orientation 
cultures. According to Hofstede (2001, p.361), businesses in long-term oriented cultures 
do not expect immediate results, while the immediate result is a major concern in short-
term oriented cultures. Similarly, Chen et al. (2005) showed that people from Western 
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cultures are less patient and discount the future to a greater degree than do people from 
Eastern cultures.  
Putting the issues of risk-taking and time horizon, we expect that collectivistic and long-
term oriented cultures encourage R&D investment, and individualistic and short-term 
oriented cultures discourage R&D investment. As shown by Table 1, Japan and Korea 
are collectivistic and long-term oriented countries, and Canada, France, Italy, UK and 
US are individualistic and short-term oriented countries. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
firms in the East Asian countries are more active in R&D investment decisions than are 
firms in the Western countries. 
The extent to which firms are active in R&D is relevant with investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, which is one of the most debated topics in the literature on corporate finance 
(see Hubbard, 1998 for a review). The seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
proposed that a firm’s financial status does not influence investment decisions. 
However, it has been observed that firms prefer internal finance when making 
investment decisions. According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), 
firms prefer internal sources for financing investment to external sources because 
internal finance is cheaper than external finance as a result of asymmetric information. 
If a firm has better information about its investment projects than outside investors, the 
firm prefers to finance such projects with internal sources of fund since outside 
investors will demand a premium for bearing risk. This leads to the prediction that 
investment is sensitive to internal funds. 
We expect that corporate R&D investments are more sensitive to internal cash flow for 
firms that are more active in R&D, ceteris paribus. Cash flow is more important for firms 
when they are willing to make investments. R&D-active firms are more sensitive to the 
availability of internal funds. Thus, the extent to which firms are willing to make R&D 
investments can be measured by the sensitivity of investment in R&D to internal funds. 
Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested in this study would be: R&D investment is more 
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sensitive to internal funds for firms in Japan and Korea than for firms in the Western 
countries. 
 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
We use firm-level panel data from Japan, Korea, Canada, France, Italy, UK, and US for 
the period 1998-2012. The data set used in this study contains corporate financial data 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We split the countries into two groups according to 
their individualism and long-term orientation scores. Group I includes the countries 
with collectivistic and long-term oriented cultures such as Japan and Korea and Group 
II includes the countries with individualistic and short-term oriented cultures such as 
Canada, France, Italy, UK and US. The panel data from Japan (n=1057) and Korea 
(n=247) include 1304 firms, and the data from Canada (n=71), France (n=78), Italy (n=35), 
UK (n=124), and US (n=810) include 1118 firms. 
As a preliminary check, we first examined GDP growth rates across the sample 
countries. Table 2 shows the values of GDP growth (annual %) from 1998 to 2011 for the 
selected countries, which is graphically illustrated in Figure 1, which did not reveal any 
significant differences with respect to the macroeconomic conditions for the countries 
over the period. 
Table 2: GDP growth (annual %) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Japan 
Korea 
Canada 
France 
Italy 
UK 
US 
-2.00 
-6.85 
4.09 
3.37 
1.44 
3.51 
4.40 
-0.19 
9.48 
5.53 
3.29 
1.45 
3.16 
4.86 
2.25 
8.48 
5.23 
3.67 
3.65 
4.23 
4.17 
0.35 
3.97 
1.78 
1.83 
1.86 
2.88 
1.09 
0.28 
7.15 
2.92 
0.92 
0.45 
2.43 
1.82 
1.68 
2.80 
1.88 
0.89 
-0.04 
3.81 
2.55 
2.36 
4.61 
3.11 
2.54 
1.73 
2.90 
3.47 
1.30 
3.95 
3.01 
1.82 
0.93 
2.77 
3.07 
1.69 
5.17 
2.82 
2.46 
2.19 
2.60 
2.65 
2.19 
5.10 
2.20 
2.28 
1.68 
3.63 
1.90 
-1.04 
2.29 
0.68 
-0.08 
-1.15 
-0.96 
-0.35 
-5.52 
0.31 
-2.76 
-3.14 
-5.49 
-3.97 
-3.52 
4.43 
6.32 
3.21 
1.66 
1.81 
1.79 
3.02 
-0.70 
3.63 
2.45 
1.69 
0.43 
0.75 
1.70 
Notes: The table shows the values of GDP growth (annual %) from 1998 to 2011 for the selected countries. Source: 
World Bank. 
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Figure 1: GDP growth (annual %), 1998-2011, Source: World Bank 
 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are selected as follows. R&D investment, a 
main dependent variable, is measured by R&D spending divided by total assets 
(rnd/asset). Main independent variables employed in this study are the ratio of net sales 
to total assets (sale/asset) and the ratio of cash flow to total assets (cash/asset). The sales 
variable is used to control for investment profitability, which reflects the idea that a 
firm’s investment depends on the firm’s recent performance. Tobin’s Q is also widely 
used to control for profitability in empirical studies, but it has been criticized due to its 
lack of reliability (see Schiantareli, 1996 for a review). In a model using Tobin’s Q, 
marginal Q is supposed to be a proxy for investment profitability, but it cannot be 
observed, and thus, average Q is used instead of marginal Q. However, average Q is 
known as a poor proxy for marginal Q. In order to avoid this problem, this study uses 
the sales variable. Following the investment literature, we use the cash flow variable as 
a proxy for internal funds. 
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As control variables, the ratio of total debt to total equity (debt/equity) and the natural 
logarithm of employees (log(emp)) are used. The ratio of debt to equity controls for 
variations in firms’ financial structure such as leverage. The variable of employees is 
included as a proxy for firm size, and a logarithmic transformation is used in order to 
minimize skewness. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 Group I Group II 
full median mean s.d. median mean s.d. 
rnd/asset 
sale/asset 
cash/asset 
debt/equity 
log(emp) 
0.01 
0.90 
0.13 
0.38 
7.03 
0.44 
1.09 
0.19 
1.32 
7.19 
42.66 
12.23 
2.68 
45.21 
1.49 
0.05 
0.81 
0.19 
0.16 
7.02 
0.13 
0.87 
0.29 
0.66 
7.02 
0.53 
0.65 
0.27 
28.37 
2.27 
four industries median mean s.d. median mean s.d. 
rnd/asset 
sale/asset 
cash/asset 
debt/equity 
log(emp) 
0.02 
0.84 
0.16 
0.28 
6.93 
0.08 
0.92 
0.21 
0.63 
7.10 
1.67 
0.59 
0.53 
4.81 
1.59 
0.08 
0.72 
0.28 
0.06 
6.38 
0.17 
0.77 
0.35 
0.66 
6.50 
0.63 
0.61 
0.28 
33.45 
2.15 
the largest 50% median mean s.d. median mean s.d. 
rnd/asset 
sale/asset 
cash/asset 
debt/equity 
log(emp) 
0.00 
0.89 
0.12 
0.48 
7.87 
0.01 
0.97 
0.14 
1.86 
7.99 
0.02 
0.44 
0.11 
60.52 
1.29 
0.02 
0.87 
0.10 
0.47 
8.80 
0.04 
0.93 
0.16 
1.12 
8.89 
0.05 
0.51 
0.17 
41.51 
1.43 
the largest 25% median mean s.d. median mean s.d. 
rnd/asset 
sale/asset 
cash/asset 
debt/equity 
log(emp) 
0.00 
0.88 
0.11 
0.64 
8.73 
0.02 
0.93 
0.14 
2.22 
8.83 
0.02 
0.40 
0.11 
69.38 
1.28 
0.01 
0.83 
0.08 
0.55 
9.64 
0.03 
0.90 
0.13 
0.89 
9.70 
0.04 
0.49 
0.13 
11.96 
1.16 
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the study. The currency used 
is US dollars. 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. In order to check the robustness of our 
findings, we investigate some subsamples as well as the entire sample. We create the 
first subsample by selecting four R&D intensive industries only--electronic and 
electrical equipment, industrial engineering, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and 
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technology hardware and equipment. This study examines the sensitivity of R&D 
investment to cash flow, which may be important especially in the R&D intensive 
industries. In addition, using the subsample of the four industries is useful if significant 
inter-industry differences in R&D activity exist and the composition of industries varies 
considerably across the sample countries. Second, we construct a subsample of large 
firms in order to consider the moderating role of firm size. We examined the total 
sample including both Group I and Group II, and found that the median and the third 
quartile of total assets are $397,798 and $1,414,452, respectively. The subsample, ‘the 
largest 50%’ in Table 3, includes large firms with assets above the median, and ‘the 
largest 25%’ includes large firms with assets above the third quartile. 
 
3.2 Method 
We undertake panel data regression analysis to test the hypothesis of the relationship 
between national culture and corporate R&D investment. A dynamic sales accelerator 
investment model is used as a base model: 
(rnd/asset)i,t = b1 (sales/asset) i,t-1 + b2 (cash/asset) i,t-1 + b3(rnd/asset) i,t-1 + e i,t,  (1) 
where i refers to firm, t refers to time period, and e refers to the error term. The lagged 
R&D variable (rnd/asset)i,t-1 is included as an independent variable because it can be an 
important determinant of current R&D investment. R&D has high adjustment costs and 
thus R&D budgets tend to be “set by standard rules of thumb based upon historical 
precedence” (Hansen and Hill, 1991, p.4). Thus, previous R&D spending can have a 
significant influence on the current R&D investment.  
We also estimate the model with control variables of firm leverage and size: 
(rnd/asset)i,t = b1 (sales/asset) i,t-1 + b2 (cash/asset) i,t-1 + b3 (debt/equity) i,t-1 + b4 log(emp) i,t-1 + 
b5(rnd/asset) i,t-1 + e i,t.          (2) 
Since the lagged R&D term, included as an independent variable, is likely to be 
endogenous, OLS estimates in such a dynamic model would be inconsistent. Thus, for 
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consistent estimation of the dynamic model, we conduct the generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimation of the kind introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998), called 
system GMM. This type of GMM is known to be less biased than other types of GMM 
such as difference GMM. We include all possible lags from period t-2 as GMM 
instruments for (rnd/asset) i,t-1. The Sargan test and the second order autocorrelation test 
are used to test the validity of the instruments and the absence of autocorrelation. 
 
4 Main Analysis 
We split the selected countries into two groups (Group I and Group II), collect the 
corporate financial data of the groups of the countries, and use a dynamic GMM 
technique to obtain the estimation results of the two groups. The focus of the study is on 
the difference between the two groups with respect to the degree of willingness to 
invest in R&D, which is represented by the coefficient estimates of the cash flow term. 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
full Group I Group II 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
0.0151** 
(2.8461) 
0.0896** 
(2.7778) 
 
 
 
 
0.6588*** 
(7.0129) 
1.0000 
0.1588 
0.0123* 
(1.9694) 
0.0815** 
(2.8007) 
-0.0003 
(-0.2911) 
0.0007 
(0.3162) 
0.6708*** 
(9.8624) 
1.0000 
0.1598 
0.0029 
(0.3856) 
-0.0020 
(-0.1539) 
 
 
 
 
0.9176*** 
(16.1348) 
1.0000 
0.0863 
0.0033 
(0.4550) 
-0.0052 
(-0.4084) 
0.0001 
(0.6922) 
-0.0042 
(-1.8565) 
0.8688*** 
(14.0704) 
1.0000 
0.1858 
four industries Group I Group II 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
0.0093 
(1.7255) 
0.0598** 
(2.6074) 
 
 
 
 
0.8941*** 
(20.9947) 
1.0000 
0.1597 
0.0208* 
(2.4956) 
0.0678** 
(3.0748) 
0.0003 
(0.8163) 
-0.0035 
(-1.4745) 
0.8405*** 
(15.9755) 
1.0000 
0.1583 
0.0013 
(0.1496) 
0.0015 
(0.1157) 
 
 
 
 
0.9319*** 
(11.7867) 
1.0000 
0.0854 
0.0001 
(0.0179) 
0.0069 
(0.4531) 
0.0003 
(0.4441) 
-0.0006 
(-0.2226) 
0.9126*** 
(13.3883) 
1.0000 
0.1877 
Notes: The table shows the results of dynamic GMM regressions. Figures are regression 
coefficient estimates, and t values are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and *, respectively, indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. Sargan and AR(2) 
refer to p values for the Sargan test and the autocorrelation test for AR(2) process, respectively. 
 
Table 4 gives the results of the dynamic GMM regressions for the full sample as well as 
subsample of the four industries. The Sargan test and the second order autocorrelation 
test all confirm that the models are correctly specified. The full sample regression shows 
that the coefficient estimates of the cash flow term are statistically significant and 
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positive for the East Asian countries, but insignificant for the Western countries. This 
implies that R&D investment is significantly sensitive to cash flow for firms in Japan 
and Korea, but is not sensitive for firms in the Western countries. This finding is quite 
robust, occurring on the cash flow terms both with and without the control variables in 
the regression. We interpret the result to imply that East Asian cultures encourage firms 
to invest in R&D more than Western cultures. 
In order to take industry effects into account, we also apply the regression analysis to 
the subsample of four R&D intensive industries. Investigating this subsample yields the 
same results as in the full sample: the sensitivity of firms' R&D investment to cash flow 
is positive and significant in Japan and Korea, but insignificant in the remaining 
Western countries. 
Previous empirical studies of investment such as Fazzari et al. (1988) have explained 
that the investment-cash flow sensitivity would measure the degree of financial 
constraints faced by firms (see Hubbard, 1998 for a review). Such an interpretation can 
explain the observed differences between the two groups of countries if firms in Group 
I suffer more financial constraints than do firms in Group II. In order to check this 
possibility, we examine the subsample of large firms. Large firms face less severe 
financial constraints than small firms, and thus the financial problem is not expected to 
play an important role in this subsample. Moreover, according to Schumpeter, large 
firms innovate more than small firms, and thus the subsample of large firms is 
particularly relevant for the investigation of R&D investment.  
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Table 5: Regression Results (large firms) 
the largest 50% Group I Group II 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
0.0119*** 
(3.5403) 
0.0672*** 
(3.3394) 
 
 
 
 
0.7555*** 
(13.1842) 
1.0000 
0.1608 
0.0075 
(1.3942) 
0.0739** 
(2.8459) 
0.0006 
(1.0644) 
0.0018 
(0.9919) 
0.7326*** 
(11.8452) 
1.0000 
0.4642 
0.0034 
(0.4479) 
-0.0011 
(-0.0830) 
 
 
 
 
0.9074*** 
(16.0907) 
1.0000 
0.0917 
0.0032 
(0.4343) 
-0.0032 
(-0.2507) 
0.0000 
(0.1936) 
-0.0044 
(-1.8184) 
0.8588*** 
(14.7841) 
1.0000 
0.1020 
the largest 25% Group I Group II 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
0.0121*** 
(3.4695) 
0.0678*** 
(3.3004) 
 
 
 
 
0.7510*** 
(13.2390) 
1.0000 
0.4677 
0.0073 
(1.3851) 
0.0753** 
(2.9038) 
0.0006 
(1.1264) 
0.0018 
(0.9370) 
0.7377*** 
(12.2186) 
1.0000 
0.2523 
0.0042 
(0.5164) 
-0.0027 
(-0.2102) 
 
 
 
 
0.9081*** 
(15.9029) 
1.0000 
0.0574 
0.0042 
(0.5634) 
-0.0037 
(-0.2832) 
-0.0000 
(-0.2001) 
-0.0043 
(-1.5892) 
0.8554*** 
(14.2763) 
1.0000 
0.0917 
Notes: The table shows the results of dynamic GMM regressions. Figures are regression 
coefficient estimates, and t values are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and *, respectively, indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. Sargan and AR(2) 
refer to p values for the Sargan test and the autocorrelation test for AR(2) process, respectively. 
 
The results of the dynamic GMM regressions using the subsample of large firms are 
presented in Table 5. We examine the subsample of firms with assets above the median 
(the largest 50%) and the subsample of firms with assets above the third quartile (the 
largest 25%). These subsamples do not add anything new to the main findings. Still, the 
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sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow is found to be significant and positive in 
Group I only. 
Another interesting point is that, in Group II, the sales variable (in addition to the cash 
variable) is also insignificant. Corporate R&D investment does not respond to variations 
in sales as well as cash flow in the Western countries. This observation strongly 
supports the hypothesis of less active in R&D for firms in the Western cultures. 
Overall, we observe that corporate R&D investment responds strongly to movements in 
internal funds in East Asian cultures, but not in Western cultures. Since the result holds 
even when we look at large firms only, we argue that the difference between the two 
groups is likely due to national culture rather than the degree of financial constraints. 
 
5 Extended Analysis 
As mentioned above, many studies have interpreted a strong sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow as a high degree of financial constraints faced by firms. In this regard, we 
can interpret our results of the difference between the two groups as follows: the strong 
sensitivity in Group I probably reflects the existence of financial constraints faced by 
firms in the Group I countries. Although this issue has been examined to some extent in 
the previous section, we address the issue in other ways, by posing the two separate 
questions: One is whether the difference between the two groups in terms of the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity can be explained by a difference in financial 
development across the groups; Another question is whether the difference can be 
attributed to a difference in legal environment for sources of finance. We will discuss 
these two issues in turn. 
 
5.1 Financial Development 
First, we consider the possibility that the level of financial system development affects 
the sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow. If the Western countries in the sample 
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are endowed with well-developed financial markets, firms in the countries do not 
necessarily rely on internal funds for investing. This may explain the insignificant effect 
of cash flow on R&D investment in Group II.  
Some previous studies reported a negative relationship between financial development 
and financial constraints. Love (2003) utilized firm-level data for 36 countries over the 
period 1988-1998 and found that financial constraints (or the effect of internal funds on 
firms’ discount factor) decreased with financial development. Love and Zicchino (2006) 
also observed that the positive effect of internal funds on investment is higher in 
countries with less developed financial systems. Some other studies of financial 
constraints have focused on the sensitivity of firms’ cash holdings to their cash flows 
instead of the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Almeida et al. (2004) claimed that 
financially constrained firms would save cash today for future investment projects 
while cash holdings would not necessarily be related to cash flows for unconstrained 
firms, and they found evidence supporting the hypothesis. Especially, there exists 
research demonstrating the moderating role of financial development on the sensitivity 
of firms’ cash holdings on cash flows. Khurana et al. (2006) examined firm-level data for 
35 countries over the years 1994-2002 and found that the sensitivity of cash holdings to 
cash flows decreased with financial development. 
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Table 6: Financial Development and Investor Protection 
Financial Development Investor Protection 
Group Country FD FININT STKMKT Group Country ASR ADR 
I Japan 
Korea 
1.44 
1.73 
2.71 
0.90 
0.17 
2.56 
I Japan 
Korea 
65 
62 
4 
2 
IIa Italy 
France 
Canada 
0.56 
0.73 
0.54 
0.75 
0.85 
0.59 
0.38 
0.61 
0.50 
IIc France 
Italy 
69 
62 
3 
1 
IIb  
UK 
US 
 
2.15 
2.64 
 
2.02 
2.01 
 
2.27 
3.27 
IId Canada 
UK 
US 
74 
78 
71 
5 
5 
5 
Notes: The table shows the index of financial development for each country reported by Khurana et 
al. (2006, p.795) and the index of investor protection for each country reported by John et al. (2008, 
p.1698). FD refers to a measure of financial development; FININT refers to the financial intermediary 
development index; STKMKT refers to the stock market development index; ASR refers to the rating 
of quality of the accounting disclosure standards; and ADR refers to the anti-director rights index. 
 
Prior studies hold that financial development would mitigate the sensitivity of 
investment (or cash holdings) to cash flow. In order to take this hypothesis into account, 
we compare the level of financial development in the countries. Table 6 shows the index 
of financial development for the selected countries, reported by Khurana et al. (2006, 
p.795), in which FININT represents a measure of financial intermediary development, 
measured by the sum of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and the credit going to the 
private sector per GDP, while STKMKT refers to a measure of stock market 
development, measured by the sum of market capitalization per GDP, total value 
traded per GDP, and total value traded per market capitalization. FD is the sum of 
STKMKT and FININT and indicates a measure of financial development. Khurana et al. 
(2006) used indices obtained from the World Bank database as of 2002. 
According to Table 6, it is clear that UK and US among Group II are financially 
developed. Their scores of FD, FININT, and STKMKT are much higher than the scores 
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of the other countries. In contrast, the remaining countries of Group II, that is, Italy, 
France, and Canada, have much lower scores. The countries in Group I are in between. 
Thus, we split Group II into two subgroups: IIa refers to the Western countries that are 
less financially developed and IIb refers to the Western countries that are more 
financially developed. IIa includes Italy, France, and Canada, and IIb includes UK and 
US. 
Table 7: Regression Results (Group II) 
financial development Group IIa Group IIb 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
-0.0119 
(-0.4017) 
0.0403 
(0.5537) 
 
 
 
 
0.9930*** 
(14.4034) 
1.0000 
0.0666 
-0.0128 
(-0.1382) 
0.0414 
(0.1068) 
0.0000 
(0.0250) 
0.0014 
(0.0142) 
1.0204 
(1.3226) 
1.0000 
0.0993 
-0.0013 
(-0.2489) 
-0.0079 
(-0.8055) 
 
 
 
 
0.9712*** 
(21.5854) 
1.0000 
0.0737 
-0.0017 
(-0.3413) 
-0.0061 
(-0.7211) 
0.0001 
(0.4594) 
-0.0025 
(-1..4809) 
0.9372*** 
(20.5093) 
1.0000 
0.1579 
four industries Group I Group II 
(sale/asset) t-1 
 
(cash/asset) t-1 
 
(debt/equity) t-1 
 
log(emp) t-1 
 
(rnd/asset) t-1 
 
Sargan 
AR(2) 
-0.0089 
(-0.4518) 
0.0169 
(0.3048) 
 
 
 
 
0.9299*** 
(6.8267) 
1.0000 
0.1697 
-0.0103 
(-0.1247) 
0.0038 
(0.0096) 
0.0002 
(0.1006) 
-0.0080 
(-0.0807) 
0.9240 
(0.8814) 
1.0000 
0.3201 
-0.0014 
(-0.2553) 
-0.0079 
(-0.8026) 
 
 
 
 
0.9714*** 
(21.6220) 
1.0000 
0.0846 
-0.0017 
(-0.3444) 
-0.0061 
(-0.7220) 
0.0001 
(0.4848) 
-0.0025 
(-1.5046) 
0.9373*** 
(20.6243) 
1.0000 
0.1900 
Notes: The table shows the results of dynamic GMM regressions. Figures are regression 
coefficient estimates, and t values are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and *, respectively, indicate significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. Sargan and AR(2) 
refer to p values for the Sargan test and the autocorrelation test for AR(2) process, respectively. 
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We apply the GMM method to the samples of Group IIa and IIb, and compare the 
results. If the hypothesis of the impact of financial development on the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity holds for the data, Group IIa is expected to show significant sensitivity 
while Group IIb is not. The regression results of the subgroups of Group II, shown in 
Table 7, do not support the hypothesis. We find the insignificant sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow in both Group IIa and Group IIb. R&D investment is not 
sensitive to cash flow for firms both in the countries with low financial development 
and in the countries with high financial development. It indicates that the level of 
financial development does not influence the relationship between R&D investment 
and internal funds. This result is consistent with recent evidence reported by Suh (2007) 
investigating firm-level data of 35 countries, which does not support that firms in 
financially less developed countries exhibit high investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 
5.2 Legal Environment 
Another issue is the effect of legal environment on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Recent literature has focused on legal rules regarding investors’ rights. According to La 
Porta et al. (1998), the laws governing investor protection and the quality of 
enforcement of the laws differ considerably around the world, and the legal 
environment is closely related to economic and financial development. John et al. (2008) 
empirically examined a large panel of manufacturing firms from 39 countries over the 
period 1992-2002 and reported a significant positive relationship between risk-taking 
and investor protection.  
Especially, Demirguc and Maksimovic (1998) used a sample of 30 countries and found 
that firms in countries with better investor protection were able to obtain external funds. 
This evidence leads to the conclusion that as investor protection improves, investment 
is less sensitive to internal funds. If Group II of the sample is composed of countries 
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with strong investor protection, the insensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow 
observed in Group II can be explained by the theory of the legal system of investor 
protection. 
First of all, in order to deal with the issue of the legal system of investor protection, we 
compare the sample countries with regard to investor protection. Following John et al. 
(2008), we use the indices of the quality of accounting disclosure standards (ASR) and of 
anti-director rights (ADR) as measures of investor protection. High accounting 
disclosure standards and high anti-director rights imply better investor protection. The 
investor protection scores of each country are given in Table 6. We can observe that 
France and Italy among Group II countries as well as Group I countries have relatively 
weak investor protection. Thus, it is not likely that the insensitivity of investment in 
Group II is due to strong investor protection. 
It might be claimed that firms in Group I countries show significant sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow because of weak investor protection. To check this argument 
further, we split the sample of Group II into two, the countries with weak investor 
protection (IIc) and the countries with strong investor protection (IId). The former 
includes France and Italy, while the latter includes Canada, UK, and US. We conduct 
the GMM estimations both for the subgroups, IIc and IId. From the regression results, 
presented in Table 7, we do not see any difference between the two subgroups in terms 
of sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Thus, we conclude that the level of investor 
protection does not play a role in influencing international differences in R&D 
investment decisions at the firm level. 
 
6 Conclusion 
We argue that national culture accounts for the variation in firms' investment behavior. 
In order to check this argument, we take the two cultures--East Asian and Western 
cultures--into account and compare them. Based on Hofstede’s work and the cushion 
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hypothesis, we predict that firms in the East Asian countries are more likely to engage 
in R&D investment than are firms in the Western countries because East Asian cultures 
are collectivistic and long-term oriented while Western cultures are individualistic and 
short-term oriented. 
We use the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of firms’ willingness to invest 
in R&D. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested in this study is that investment is more 
sensitive to cash flow for firms in the East Asian countries than in the Western countries. 
We collect firm-level panel data for the East Asian countries (Japan and Korea) and the 
Western countries (Canada, France, Italy, UK and US), and apply dynamic GMM 
methods to the sample. The dynamic GMM regression analysis shows that R&D 
investment is positively sensitive to internal funds for firms in Japan and Korea, but not 
sensitive for firms in the Western countries. This result is robust to model specification 
and sample splitting. Moreover, we do not find evidence that the level of financial 
development and the legal environment systemically affect the relationship between 
R&D investment and internal funds. Overall, we suggest that this evidence supports the 
hypothesis that national culture affects corporate decisions.  
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